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ABSTRACT 
This article reports the results from a series of laboratory auction markets in which consumers 
bid on meat characteristics. The characteristics examined include meat traceability (i.e., the 
ability to trace the retail meat back to the farm or animal of origin), transparency (e.g., knowing 
the meat was produced without added growth hormones, or knowing the animal was humanely 
treated), and extra assurances (e.g., extra meat safety assurances). This laboratory study 
provides non-hypothetical bid data on consumer preferences for a sample of consumers in 
Logan, Utah, for traceability, transparency, and assurances (TTA) in red meat at a time when 
the United States currently lags other countries in development of TTA meat systems. Results 
suggest these consumers would be willing to pay for such TTA meat characteristics, and the 
magnitude of the consumer bids reveals that a profitable market for development of TTA 
systems in the United States might exist. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION  
There are huge gaps from the farm to the processing plants. No one knows where the cows are 
coming from .... Trace forward from the processing plant is supposed to be accurate, but no one 
knows for sure.  
- Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety Director Center for Science in the Public Interest  
Recent research suggests the U.S. red-meat system is falling behind many of its major 
competitors and trading partners in terms of traceability, transparency, and other quality 
assurances (TTA) (Liddell and Bailey). In fact, Liddell and Bailey). In fact, Liddell and Bailey 
report the U.S. pork system ranks last when compared against the United Kingdom (UK), 
Denmark, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand for TTA. They note that the U.S. red-
meat inspection system is designed principally to control pathogens, while some competitors' 
inspection systems are designed not only to control pathogens but also to trace meat back to its 
origin and provide information on other "extrinsic"[1] characteristics.  
Traceability is sometimes called "identity preservation," and is defined by Liddell and Bailey as 
the ability to track the inputs used to make food products backward to their source at different 
levels of the marketing chain. Transparency refers to the public disclosure and availability of 
information on all of the rules, procedures, and practices used to produce a food product at 
each level of the marketing chain (Baines and Davies 1998; Early; Liddell and Bailey).  
Quality assurance is comprised of three key elements: (a) managing hygiene to ensure food 
safety, (b) ensuring quality through grading and other measurements, and (c) providing 
mechanisms for product recalls (Early; Baines). For example, the processes for ensuring 
hygiene in the European Union (EU) red-meat system have focused on Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) systems beginning at the farm level.  
Ensuring quality in red-meat systems includes measurements of the intrinsic quality of a carcass 
or product (tenderness, back fat, curing, etc.). Intrinsic quality measurements are common to 
most government grading systems, including those of the United States, its trading partners, 
and competitors. However, the EU system also provides measures of the extrinsic qualities of 
red meat. An example would be assurances of the absence of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in a product. TTA is different from typical quality assurances and standardization in its 
scope (tracing throughout the market chain) and focus (certification of more than just food 
safety). Because some competitors do include extrinsic quality assurances in their red-meat 
products and the United States typically does not, we include extrinsic quality characteristics as 
part of our analysis.  
An examination of the evolution of the red-meat inspection system in the EU in recent years is 
essential to understanding why TTA is an important issue. The emphasis on TTA in the EU 
evolved in response to the perceived regulatory failure of EU governments to provide adequate 
information to consumers during the EU bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)[2] crisis 
(Baines and Davies 1998). As a result, the EU has developed systems enhancing the credibility 
of assurances about certain attributes such as animal welfare, and even food safety issues such 
as BSE, by filling the perceived information void inherent in standard government grading 
practices with TTA. The EU demands accountability at all stages of the marketing chain, not 
only for red meat but also for other products (Jones). However, because of the BSE issue, red 
meat probably has been the most economically important, or at least the most politically 
important, application of TTA.  
Although little direct red-meat trade takes place between the EU and the United States, the EU 
is a competitor in world trade for other markets, especially for pork in Japan (Liddell and Bailey). 
Perhaps more importantly, the EU system is influencing change by other major competitors 
such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay, all of which are developing trace-back, 
red-meat systems (Liddell and Bailey; Lewis; Early; Baines and Davies 2000; Abbatemarico).  
Because TTA systems in the EU were implemented primarily in response to the BSE crisis, TTA 
was not used directly as a value-adding marketing strategy. Consequently, willingness to pay 
(WTP) for characteristics like traceability was not a primary consideration when requirements for 
providing traceability were imposed on market participants, but rather became a requirement to 
gain access to markets. Conversely, discussions in the United States about TTA have focused 
on consumers' WTP. For example, at a recent conference discussing genetically modified 
crops, jointly sponsored by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology and the 
USDA/Economic Research Service, WTP was identified as one of the primary issues involved in 
identity preservation.  
Dr. John Wiemers, chairman of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) Interagency Committee on Animal Identification, has stated that red-meat 
traceability systems will only be implemented in the United States if consumers are found to be 
willing to pay for the additional costs to produce traceable products-suggesting evidence of 
consumer WTP for TTA products is essential if TTA systems are to be developed in the United 
States. However, some TTA products have been developed by private U.S. companies. For 
example, Farmland Foods and Premium Standard Farms have developed TTA pork products. 
This recent exploitation of TTA systems by large U.S. firms clearly demonstrates the emerging 
importance of TTA systems and products in the United States, and emphasizes the need for 
study of this topic.  
This article presents initial evidence on U.S. consumers' WTP for TTA characteristics in beef 
and pork. We report the results from a series of controlled laboratory experiments in which 
consumers bid in a (theoretically) demand-revealing auction on meat sandwich upgrades. 
These WTP auctions generate non-hypothetical data on consumer valuation of TTA attributes in 
meat and are a first step toward identifying the potential U.S. markets) for meat produced 
through a TTA system (Shogren et al. 1994b).  
A limited amount of research has been conducted on characteristics that could be verified using 
traceability. For example, Lusk, Roosen, and Fox have examined consumer willingness to pay 
for beef products not treated with growth hormones or fed genetically modified grain. In a 
related study, Lusk and Fox also investigated the effect of mandatory labeling of hormone-
treated beef, or beef that had been produced with genetically modified grains, on beef products. 
Other work by Grannis, Hooker, and Thilmany measured consumer preferences for selected 
characteristics in beef marketed as "natural." However, to our knowledge, no study has directly 
examined consumer WTP for TTA in the United States.  
Because very limited information is available on WTP for red meat with TTA characteristics, our 
results can help lower the risk of retail trials of TTA meat products. Our findings show 
consumers are willing to pay significant amounts of money to upgrade a sandwich to an 
otherwise identical sandwich containing meat with TTA attributes. Furthermore, our results 
suggest the market for TTA beef may be broader than the market for TTA pork, as auction 
market valuation of the latter is more sensitive to the specific demographic characteristics of 
consumers. Part of the focus of our analysis is on what consumers are willing to pay for extrinsic 
quality assurances because extrinsic characteristics are beyond the typical assurances of food 
safety and intrinsic qualities provided by public sector inspection and grading in the United 
States (Baines and Davies 2000).  
 
BACKGROUND ON TTA  
TTA is obtained through a system of records and certifications allowing a product to be traced 
and certified back to different points in the food chain. Currently, most U.S. red meat is 
traceable from retail back to the distributor or processor but not to the farm or animal level. 
Establishing TTA prior to processing would require a system currently not generally in place in 
the United States.  
Red-meat producers and processors in the United States should be concerned that the U.S. 
system is lagging in terms of TTA, for at least three reasons. First, consumers have become 
increasingly concerned about the processes (inputs and methods) used to produce food (e.g., 
Dorey; Nakamoto). Second, if competitors are able to differentiate their redmeat products as 
being superior to U.S. red-meat products in terms of TTA, the United States may lose market 
share in its export markets for red meat. For example, increased food safety concerns in Japan, 
including the recent discovery of BSE in beef, could potentially lead to heightened import 
restrictions and regulations (Nakamoto). Japan is the United States' principal export market for 
red meat, and such concerns could eventually lead to a loss of U.S. market share if competitors 
such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Denmark are successful in convincing Japanese 
buyers their products are "safer" than U.S. products because their system provides more TTA 
than the U.S. system. Finally, consumers may simply be willing to pay for red-meat products 
with TTA characteristics, and a market opportunity may be lost to U.S. producers if such 
products are not developed in the United States.  
Large investments will be needed to make significant changes in the U.S. red-meat system to 
address TTA concerns.[3] Recapturing these investments will require capturing a significant 
market share of the red-meat market for products featuring TTA characteristics. This challenge 
will probably warrant a significant penetration of domestic red-meat markets as well as foreign 
markets. Consequently, measuring WTP is a critical component of the market potential for TTA 
products. A large-scale field experiment would be an effective but prohibitively costly way of 
conducting such research. As an alternative, the small-scale controlled laboratory experiments 
described in the next section offer a cheap way of generating initial data on domestic consumer 
attitudes about WTP for TTA.  
Economic research on issues relating to TTA is quite limited because these systems have been 
evolving only within the past few years. The economic literature dealing with TTA focuses 
primarily on the aftermath of the BSE crisis in the United Kingdom. For example, Palmer, and 
Loader and Hobbs document the economic devastation to the British beef industry resulting 
from the BSE scare.  
Hobbs used transaction costs economics to examine the perceived value of tracing beef cattle 
from the farm to the packer level (1996a), and between beef suppliers and retail outlets in the 
United Kingdom (1996b). Her findings indicate traceability is the most important characteristic 
desired by large UK beef processors when purchasing cattle from farmers (1996a). Hobbs 
(1996b) also found that the ease of traceability ranked ahead of prices paid to processors as an 
important characteristic to consider when supermarkets in the UK purchased meat.  
Latouche, Rainelli, and Vermersch reported that consumers in the Rennes area of France were 
willing to pay for traceability. However, their study focused entirely on the issue of BSE, and did 
not address more general issues relating to TTA. Verbeke et al. examined the attitudes of 
Belgian meat consumers about pork, and argue traceability systems would work best when 
coupled with efforts to improve intrinsic qualities such as leanness, taste, tenderness, and the 
extrinsic quality of healthiness. None of these studies provide information or data for U.S. 
consumers and all are narrowly focused, typically dealing with only one issue such as BSE.  
One recent study suggests that improving animal tracking systems in the United States may be 
economically justified for beef because of the added efficiency these systems would provide in 
tracking animal diseases alone (Disney et al.). While the same study found that tracking 
systems for pork in the United States could not be justified solely for their benefit in controlling 
animal diseases, it suggested other benefits, such as consumer acceptance, could justify the 
implementation of tracking systems. These findings again point to the importance of information 
on consumer WTP if TTA systems were to be implemented in the United States.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
Data on TTA systems in the United States are not publicly available. Thus a laboratory market 
approach is used for eliciting individuals' WTP for food traceability and related characteristics. 
Our experiments follow the design utilized in Shogren et al. (1994b) for eliciting bids to 
"upgrade" a meat sandwich. Subjects in the experiments are given a free lunch, which includes 
a meat sandwich, along with $15 cash at the beginning of a one-hour experiment. Subjects are 
allowed to bid on what they would be willing to pay to exchange or upgrade their existing 
sandwich for a sandwich with meat described as having one or more extra verifiable attributes. 
Subjects are informed their baseline sandwich meets current standards enforced by the USDA, 
but the baseline sandwich does not have the extra verifiable attributes provided in the upgrade 
sandwiches.  
The upgrades considered are based on each of the elements of TTA: (a) transparency, which in 
the experiments is given by extra assurance or information relating to the processes used to 
produce meat, including animal treatment (humane treatment procedures and no added growth 
hormones used in production of the meat); (b) assurance, which in the experiments is given by 
extra assurance of food safety (extra tests conducted for E. coli or Salmonella for beef or pork, 
respectively); (c) traceability, which in the experiments is stated as the ability to trace the meat 
back to the farm of origin;[4] and (d) all three upgrades combined. The respective auction 
sandwiches corresponding to these TTA elements are numbered as Sandwich 1, Sandwich 2, 
Sandwich 3, and Sandwich 4.[5]  
While it is apparent that much of the value of a TTA system is likely to be in the verifiable 
attributes of the product, and not just the fact the product can be traced back to the farm or 
origin, our use of an auction sandwich verifying only traceability is useful for two purposes. First, 
in valuing traceability by itself, we gain initial insights on consumer WTP just for this information 
net of the attributes which can be verified because of the traceability system. Second, the 
comparison of traceability bids to bids on other sandwiches will then provide insights into the 
perceived value of adding assurances about certain characteristics along with the traceability 
information.  
Subjects were recruited from four different Utah State University demographic cohorts for the 
experiments. At the time of their recruitment, subjects were informed either beef or pork would 
be consumed as part of the free lunch. Each experimental group consisted of 13 or 14 
individuals, on average. Eight experiments were conducted, with four experiments using ham 
sandwiches and four using roast beef sandwiches. Experiment participants were classified into 
four distinct demographic groups, such that the experimental groups could be categorized as 
follows: (a) students, (b) faculty, (c) professional staff (e.g., accountants, administrative 
personnel, etc.), and (d) classified staff (e.g., maintenance workers, buildings and grounds 
keepers, etc.).  
Experiments were conducted in groups of similar individuals for two reasons. First, it is often the 
case that individuals of similar sociodemographic populations shop in similar locations, and so 
this approach may help engage subjects in the auction process by lowering socioeconomic 
status barriers in the lab. Second, ex post controls for the experimental group can help uncover 
the potential importance of consumer demographics in estimating the market potential for 
traceable food products.  
Subjects were recruited from a pool as diverse as possible from within the university population. 
The recruitment process was conducted either by classroom visit (for soliciting students), e-mail 
advertisement (for faculty and professional staff), or flyer (for classified staff). Recruitment 
methods for the various cohort groups reflect the peculiarities of contacting each group for 
notification of the experiment opportunity. Although classroom visits imply most subjects 
comprising the student experiment came from a small number of classes, advertisements for 
the faculty and staff experiments reached campuswide. To the extent individuals who respond 
to such recruitment methods may be different from others, our sample is likely not a pure 
random sample. However, this criticism would equally apply to a field experiment because those 
responding and participating may be distinct from those who do not participate.  
Because the sample consists of individuals all affiliated with the university, some sample 
statistics from our overall subject pool are provided in table 1 to demonstrate the sample is 
representative. In addition to the information in table 1, the level of education completed by our 
sample ranges from high school to post-graduate degrees, though most had completed at least 
some college. Finally, 67% of the subjects reported they are personally responsible for making 
most of the food purchase decisions for their household.  
Once the subjects arrived at the experiment site, they were seated with the free lunch in front of 
them, given the $15 cash, and told to await instructions before unwrapping the lunch sandwich. 
While subjects were given written instructions for the experiment, the instructions also were 
explained orally by the same experimenter in all experiments, and all clarification questions 
were answered prior to commencement of the experiment.[6]  
Based on the auction format, subjects would place an anonymous bid to upgrade their existing 
sandwich to an auction sandwich, and the auction rules were those of a (theoretically demand-
revealing) second-price sealed-bid auction. The sandwiches were constructed to have the same 
appearance and were visually inspected by each subject during the experiment instruction 
phase prior to bidding. The instructions clearly explained the different verifiable meat attributes 
in each auction sandwich.[7]  
After all the subjects' questions were answered, bids from each subject were taken first for 
Sandwich 1, then Sandwich 2, then Sandwich 3, and finally Sandwich 4 (this constituted one 
round of the auction). Ten total rounds were conducted with each group to allow for bid 
stabilization (see Hayes et al.; Shogren et al. 1994b; Shogren et al. 2001). Market price 
information (i.e., the second highest bid) for each sandwich was announced after each round 
and prior to eliciting the next round's bid for that sandwich. Subjects were aware that a random 
draw at the end of the 10th round would determine which of the four simultaneous auctions 
would be binding.[8] A second random draw determined which of the 10 rounds would be 
binding. Consequently, only one of the auction sandwiches was actually auctioned in each 
experiment.  
 
Subjects were fully aware prior to commencing the first round that there was a uniform chance 
of any round for any auction sandwich being the binding auction, and the subjects reported no 
confusion regarding their understanding of these procedures. At the end of the experiment, after 
the binding auction was randomly drawn, the appropriate auction was consummated by the 
winning subject paying the second highest bid amount to exchange his/her original sandwich for 
the auction sandwich. Thus, only one auction winner per experimental group consumed an 
auction sandwich. All subjects were then required to consume their sandwiches prior to leaving 
with their experiment cash.  
Unlike the auctions reported in Shogren et al. (1994b), subject bids were not truncated at zero, 
although we expected individuals would place positive value on the attributes studied in this 
experiment. The benefit of this approach is that full demand revelation is allowed even if a TTA 
characteristic is considered a "bad." The drawback is that subjects may submit negative bids 
strategically rather than to reveal true WTP (or, in such cases, willingness to accept).  
Shogren et al. (2002) examine demand-revealing properties of the Vickrey auction when both 
positive and negative values are induced upon subjects and negative bids are allowed. While 
subject bids were demand revealing on average, results found by Shogren et al. indicate 
subjects who negatively value an item tend to overbid their true value for the item-i.e., they do 
not fully reveal the extent of their negative valuation of the item. As seen in the discussion of our 
results, negative bidding is rare in our experiments, and is found more often in early rounds-
rounds not examined in our later regression analysis.  
The auction format used in WTP experiments is an important consideration. While this study is 
not meant to test auction theory, one would hope the auction format employed does elicit true 
valuations from subjects. Some researchers report Vickrey auctions are demand revealing on 
average (e.g., Shogren et al. 2001), while others conclude bidders engage in strategic bidding 
(e.g., Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler). Some observe similarity in bids across auction mechanisms 
(Shogren et al. 1994a), and others do not (Rutstrom). To the extent bidding may be influenced 
by the particular auction design, there is well-justified concern over the validity of data from any 
particular study. It is not our intent to resolve this issue in the present study, but we note some 
useful guidelines in evaluating the data generated.  
First, regardless of the particular auction mechanism used, the experiments provide valuable 
comparative data on WTP for different TTA attributes because the same auction mechanism is 
used to elicit values for each sandwich type. Therefore, valuable insights may be gained about 
the characteristics being tested. For example, the results can indicate whether or not individuals 
value additional food safety more or less than additional animal treatment guarantees.  
Second, although the current research is an initial investigation of WTP for TTA attributes and is 
meant as a lower cost alternative to expensive retail trials, others may choose a more in-depth 
study at the outset. For example, Shogren et al. (1999) generate data from retail, survey, and 
auction markets to examine preferences for irradiated meat. It is noteworthy that their results 
offer support for the WTP information obtained from experimental auctions.  
Ultimately, researchers are faced with the choice of whether to go beyond experimental data 
generation in the initial research stage, or in latter stages. Nevertheless, what is learned from 
experimental food auctions appears to be a useful input for the design of broader retail trials. As 
noted by Hayes et al., the most prudent approach is to view our WTP estimates as upper 
bounds on any retail WTP.  
 
RESULTS  
The main results of average bid behavior for beef and pork are highlighted in figures 1 and 2, 
respectively. While the magnitudes of the average bids are important, our primary discussions 
involve comparisons of bids for different attributes of the same type of meat and for the same 
attribute for different types of meat. The comparisons across meat types are reasonable 
because the value of the sandwich in both the beef and ham auction is roughly the same. As 
stated previously, the magnitudes of the average bids are considered more as an upper bound 
on bids due to the nature of the one-day experiment (Hayes et al.). Nonetheless, it is apparent 
the average subject is willing to pay nontrivial amounts of money to upgrade the meat in a 
sandwich valued at approximately $3. Average WTP (averaged across all subjects and all 
rounds) to upgrade the roast beef sandwich is $0.23 to add basic traceability, $0.50 to add 
assurances on animal treatment, $0.63 to add extra assurances of food safety, and $1.06 to 
upgrade the sandwich to one in which the roast beef contains all three upgrades. For pork, the 
corresponding upgrades were valued, on average, at $0.50, $0.53, $0.59, and $1.14.[9]  
Although traceability for beef products is valued to some extent, subjects placed an even larger 
value on specific attributes which might be verified by a traceable meat system (figure 1). Bids 
for beef traceability are statistically lower than bids for both animal treatment assurances and 
increased food safety (p = 0.05 and p = 0.01, respectively, for the two-tailed nonparametric 
Friedman test).[10] Similarly, a comparison between the specific attributes of food safety and 
animal treatment reveals higher bids for food safety than for animal treatment, although the 
significance of this comparison is marginal (p = 0.11). Subjects are also willing to pay 
significantly more for beef combining all three of these meat attributes in a single product (p < 
0.01 for each comparison except all attributes compared with food safety, where p = 0.05) than 
they were for the base sandwich. However, the average bid for the "everything" beef sandwich 
is less than the sum of the bids for individual meat attributes, suggesting subjects display a 
decreasing marginal WTP for additional attributes.  
Figure 2 presents the comparable average bidding data for the ham sandwich upgrade. The bid 
data for each auction sandwich are not as neatly ordered for ham as they are for beef, but 
subjects are still willing to pay significantly more for animal treatment and food safety than for 
traceability (p = 0.10 and p = 0.05, respectively). As with beef, subjects are willing to pay 
significantly more for all attributes together in the sandwich meat (p = 0.05, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively, for average bid comparisons of Sandwich 1 and Sandwich 4, Sandwich 2 and 
Sandwich 4, and Sandwich 3 and Sandwich 4) compared to the base ham sandwich, but the 
average bid for the "everything" ham sandwich upgrade is less than the sum of the individual 
meat attributes.[11]  
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the average bid frequencies for beef and ham, respectively. As seen from 
figures 3 and 4, while the average subject is willing to pay significant amounts of money for 
meat with these attributes, a significant number of subjects-anywhere from 15% (food safety) to 
55% (traceability) in beef, and from 21% (food safety) to 40% (traceability) in pork-place a zero 
value on some of the individual food attributes. As such, the conditional mean WTP for TTA 
attributes in ham and beef is even higher than for the overall sample, and is a better measure of 
WTP for the relevant market segment than the overall sample mean. The parametric regression 
results reported next help highlight whether the positive WTP of certain consumers is general 
across the demographic groups or specific to one or more demographic group.  
Table 2 reports the results of random-effects estimates of average bids for ham and beef 
attributes. The dependent variable is the average of the final five rounds of bids for each 
sandwich for a given subject (i.e., average subject bids after bid stabilization in the auction 
trials). This modeling of the data treats each individual as the cross-sectional unit in our panel 
data (i.e., bids on several sandwich types for each of many individuals). As such, we take into 
account the potential non-independence of error terms for a given individual's bids across 
sandwich types. Group-specific effects are also accounted for with group dummy variables for 
different demographic market groups. Differences in bidding behavior are therefore separated 
into those resulting from group effects of the subject group and those resulting from the 
particular meat attribute of the auction sandwich. Each coefficient estimate for a subject group 
and a TTA characteristic reflects the marginal increase or decrease in bids estimated for that 
variable, relative to the baseline of bids by professional staff for the traceability sandwich (#3). 
Because strategic bidding-- in a general sense, bidding higher or lower based on market price 
announcements-may be a concern in any WTP auction (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler), a market 
feedback variable, Market Price, is also included which measures the average market price for a 
particular sandwich in the first five rounds of bidding. Note that Market Price is predetermined 
with respect to the dependent variable which measures average bids from the last five rounds of 
bidding.  
Both students and faculty made significantly lower bids for ham than professional staff (although 
the result for students is only significant at the 10% level), while classified employees bid higher 
for ham than did professional staff (table 2). For beef, each of the other three subject groups 
placed higher average bids than the professional staff group, but the difference is only 
statistically significant for the classified employees. These group-specific effects could be a 
function of educational differences present in our cohort groups. Education levels are likely to 
affect the level of awareness of issues related to TTA, such as BSE or Salmonella outbreaks. 
Note the classified staff cohort in the experiments-the group possessing the lowest average 
education level in the sample-was willing to pay the highest premium for meat attributes in both 
the ham and beef regressions. This result is not a function of differences in average income 
levels across cohorts because the student cohort has the lowest average income.  
 
 
 
Table 2 also shows that students and faculty bid lower premiums on meat attributes for ham 
than classified employees and professional staff, but not so for beef, suggesting some 
demographic groups respond differently across meat types. Also, the range of the demographic 
group effects on average bid prices is narrower for beef than for pork in table 2, implying WTP 
for TTA pork may be more influenced by consumer demographics than for beef (assuming 
occupation is a key demographic variable). In either case, these results suggest significant 
demographic effects likely exist and are larger in magnitude for pork. Consequently, marketing 
strategies for TTA characteristics should perhaps not be uniform across meat types.  
Subjects in both the ham and beef sandwich experiments would pay significantly more for 
animal welfare than for traceability alone, and significantly more for extra food safety than for 
traceability alone. The premiums for both animal welfare and food safety are larger for beef in 
comparison to pork. Subjects are also willing to pay significantly more for a beef or ham 
sandwich with the combined characteristics (Sandwich 4) than they would for a sandwich with 
only traceability (see table 2 and figures 1 and 2). The higher premiums on TTA attributes for 
beef compared to ham perhaps point to the existence of a higher degree of concern about the 
procedures used to produce and process beef than those for ham. A possible explanation for 
this finding may be the highly publicized food scares in recent years which have been more 
specifically related to beef. [12]  
Finally, the coefficient on Market Price is statistically significant and positive for ham, but 
insignificant for beef (table 2). This finding implies there is some market feedback effect in our 
data for ham, and bids are increased as a result of market-price announcements in the Vickrey 
auction. Whether or not this is "strategic bidding" is unimportant. However, it is important that 
this effect be captured to ensure the remaining coefficient estimates remain unbiased in the 
ham model. The lack of significance of Market Price in the beef equation may be due to 
individuals initially possessing a better notion of their WTP for TTA attributes in beef. More 
publicized beef food scares in recent years may also explain this phenomenon.  
Because average bid levels are also of interest, and not just the marginal effects of distinct 
groups or TTA characteristics, combinations of coefficients from the randomeffects results are 
presented in table 3. As an example of how to interpret table 3, for the Classified Staff-Food 
Safety cell for ham, the coefficient of 1.095 is the sum of the individual coefficients from table 2 
(0.366 + 0.566 + 0.163). Significance is tested using F-tests, and the null hypothesis is that the 
sum of the coefficients is equal to zero. As can be seen in table 3, the majority of average bid 
levels for distinct demographic groups and TTA characteristics are also significantly different 
from zero, though not all are positive. This perspective of the random-effects results 
corroborates the previous conclusions: A larger bid variance based on subject groups is 
apparent in the ham relative to the beef experiments, and bid levels are increased for 
combinations of TTA characteristics for all subject groups in both meat experiments.  
How best to effectively communicate these experimental results about TTA or the results of 
broader studies, if they are conducted later, is an intriguing question. For example, informing 
consumers that a product has certain verifiable TTA characteristics is quite different than 
informing them about the methods used to verify the characteristics. Also, some consumers 
may place more trust in certain agencies (such as the USDA) making assurances about TTA 
than others. The purpose here is to obtain an initial measure of WTP for TTA without regard for 
the process by which it is verified.  
 
Identifying the best method for verifying and communicating the information requires additional 
study, including retail trials. Retail trials will be especially critical for the promotion and labeling 
questions relating to TTA (e.g., how additional TTA characteristics should be labeled and how 
they should be valued, given other information is already provided on meat labels). The results 
presented here simply indicate some positive value is generally placed on these characteristics, 
and some TTA characteristics are more valued by consumers than others.[13]  
 
DISCUSSION  
The experimental results presented here suggest many consumers, though not all, would be 
willing to pay for TTA characteristics in red-meat products. Average bids for each individual TTA 
characteristic as well as the combined characteristics were found to be positive in our subject 
sample. This finding suggests a significant marketing opportunity might be exploited if red-meat 
producers developed TTA products. Of course, these results apply only to the experimental 
group but, if verified with retail field trials, the results would imply a willingness by U.S. 
consumers to pay for TTA characteristics in red-meat products. Indeed, if these results are 
verified through retail trials, they would then meet the specific criterion suggested by John 
Wiemers of the USDA/FSIS for considering the implementation of these systems in the United 
States.  
The implementation of some type of TTA system for red meat in the United States seems 
inevitable as our trading partners and competitors move rapidly to develop such systems. While 
possible TTA systems in the United States are being examined, and in some cases 
implemented, the USDA and producer groups in the United States have sought evidence that 
TTA systems would produce a net benefit to the industry.  
Consumer WTP for TTA characteristics in pork and beef products was elicited in a non-
hypothetical setting. Results indicate the experiment subjects would be willing to pay for TTA 
characteristics in red meat. The subjects seem to value specific TTA attributes or combinations 
of attributes more than just traceability in beef and pork, implying a system of meat traceability 
alone may not be valued enough by private consumers to justify its creation. Yet traceability 
itself could be a valuable public good in terms of limiting contamination outbreaks or even 
limiting the effects of potential terrorism strikes on the American food system. Moreover, 
systems offering traceability can provide additional information on TTA characteristics) that 
consumers value even more than traceability alone, based on the results from our experimental 
group. The characteristic most valued by subjects in our experiments was food safety. 
Consequently, safety guarantees are likely an important component of any profitable TTA 
system.  
We also find some distinct results for beef and pork. Specifically, our subjects seem more willing 
to pay additional money for knowledge about animal treatment and additional food-safety 
assurances in beef than in pork; this is in addition to what subjects are willing to pay for meat 
traceability information alone. Therefore, markets for specific and distinct TTA guarantees in 
beef may be worth exploring more so than in pork. While subjects are willing to pay for TTA 
characteristics in pork, there is less evidence to show a difference in WTP for food safety and 
animal treatment guarantees versus traceability for pork than for beef. There is also evidence to 
suggest subjects' occupations-a key indicator of consumer demographics-are less a 
determinant of WTP for TTA beef than TTA pork. This finding has important implications for any 
marketing strategy for TTA meat products because TTA pork may have to be targeted to more 
specific consumer demographic groups than TTA beef, which may have a broader potential 
market.  
The results reported in this study are meant to be an initial step toward identifying the 
willingness to pay of U.S. consumers in retail markets for red meat with TTA characteristics. In 
the absence of such initial insights, there is a higher risk of proceeding toward retail field trials of 
TTA meat products, and so this study endeavors to provide valuable information for such field 
trials. These results not only need to be confirmed by field trials, but they also do not answer the 
question of how TTA systems would affect the cost structure for producing and processing red 
meat-the other important ingredient in determining market viability of TTA products. 
Nonetheless, these findings offer enough evidence to justify continued examination and 
determination of the most effective ways for implementing TTA in the U.S. red-meat system.  
 
  
NOTES 
1. Extrinsic characteristics refer to meat characteristics that neither affect food safety nor 
traditional government grading, but which are still valued by some consumers. Examples 
include assurances about animal welfare, social responsibility, or environmental responsibility.   
2. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy is commonly known as "mad cow" disease.   
3. Initial estimates suggest the investment at a single supply chain to implement TTA would be 
into the millions of dollars, depending on the level of TrA desired to be achieved (Buhr; Coe).   
4. Even though the beef used in the experiment was traceable to the animal level and the ham 
to the farm level, for consistency the participants were simply told for both ham and beef that 
Sandwich 3 contained meat traceable to the farm level.   
5. The precise auction sandwich descriptions provided to experiment participants are available 
from the authors on request.   
6. We chose not to include a pre-test auction with a candy bar (Shogren et al. 1994b) in our 
experimental sessions. Two additional experiments were later conducted using a pre-test candy 
bar auction for three rounds. The sandwich effects we report in this article are not altered by 
these additional experiments, showing the results reported in this study are not an artifact of 
excluding a pre-test candy auction. The results of the candy pre-test are available from the 
authors on request, as are all instructions related to the experiment.   
7. The auction sandwiches were truly and verifiably different in the meat they contained. 
Imported ham from Denmark was used for the traceable (and related characteristics) ham, and 
one of the Utah State University farms was used to trace the roast beef (as well as to conduct 
extra safety tests and verify humane animal treatment).   
8. While some may find elicitation of bids on four products at once cumbersome and/or 
confusing for the subjects, Melton et al. elicit simultaneous bids on eight different pork chops 
after noting that consumers regularly evaluate from six to eight packages of a particular cut of 
meat on display at once.   
9. Minor differences in the verifiable food-safety characteristic-e.g., Salmonella (ham) versus E. 
coli (beef) safety-imply the beef/ham results may not be entirely comparable, and therefore 
should be considered separately. These differences are consistent, however, with how extra 
safety assurances are implemented in existing TTA systems of other countries.   
10. The Friedman test is conducted using average bids across all rounds and all subjects as the 
unit of observation. The test assumes that bids across experiment groups are independent, but 
it also assumes some ranking can be assigned for bids across sandwich types (i.e., ranking of 
WTP in our case). As we show later, the basic results from this nonparametric test are 
consistent with the parametric regression results shown in table 2.   
11. We have yet to find a satisfactory explanation for the apparent initial upward trend in ham 
bidding data versus the initial downward trend in the beef bidding data. The parametric 
regression results in table 2 avoid this issue by focusing on the average bid in the final five 
rounds of the experiment as the dependent variable. Recall also that the purpose of a 10-round 
auction is to allow for bids to stabilize, which they apparently do in both cases.   
12. Though direct comparisons across meat types may seem risky, sandwiches were used in 
both experiments such that the base sandwich value would be similar. Caution is still advised in 
making such comparisons across meats, however, because it is unclear whether subjects' 
perceived values of a baseline ham/beef sandwich are similar.   
13. Another issue is what the "optimal level" of TTA is. However, this would require information 
about the marginal cost of providing each TrA characteristic. This information is not yet publicly 
available. For example, products can be traceable to the farm level or the animal level, but costs 
are quite different for these two levels.   
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